

VZCZCXRO9340
PP RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #1856/01 2681743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251743Z SEP 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0263
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1131
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1065
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0543
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0107
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1650

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016

TAGS: [GR](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [TU](#) [UNGA](#)

SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S 9/20 MEETING WITH TURKISH PM CHIEF
ADVISOR DAVUTOGLU

(U) Classified by William J. Brencick, Political
Minister-Counselor, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) EUR A/S Daniel Fried and NSC Director Judy Ansley met with Ambassador/Chief Advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu September 21 for 90 minutes on the margins of the UNGA general debate in New York. Following recounts the meeting's substance by theme.

PKK

¶2. (C) A/S Fried devoted the meeting's first fifteen minutes to an emphatic description of how "we are finally getting some traction on the PKK issue." General Ralston is a great choice for special emissary; his first trip was a pretty good one; Secretary Rice, NSA Hadley and Secretary Rumsfeld are all very supportive; the Iraqis "understand we are serious and have started to do the right things." We wanted them to close down PKK offices, as the GoI has now announced it is doing, and "there are other steps that may be taken." Our current USG effort in this direction "is not a one-off but part of a process" in what we comprehend is a most serious situation. We were very alarmed by this mid-summer's upswing in PKK attacks. The July 20 telephone conversation between President Bush and the Turkish PM left no-one in any doubt re the gravity of events and joint need for new action. We were glad at the Turks' appointment of their own special envoy. We will need GoT help both on the issue and to inform Turkish public opinion of USG activity regarding it.

¶3. (C) Ambassador Davutoglu's response was appreciative, but somewhat cautious. He noted that the PKK "is continuing to attack," characterizing it as a threat to Turkey's very national existence, which Al Qaeda is not to that of the U.S. He had already got word that the Iraqi government had declared it would close the PKK offices, but understood that the instruction has yet to be acted upon. Also, the Iraqis have now named their own special envoy, but little is known about the latter other than his not being a Kurd -- will he be trusted? If the Turkish people witness positive results against Kurdish terrorism, Davutoglu was sure U.S./Turkish relations can quickly recover towards their apogee of 1999: Turkish anti-Americanism, he said, is broad but not deep and arises more from regional issues like Iraq and Lebanon than intrinsic hostility.

¶4. (C) Such "positive results" will hinge on more than just taking down the PKK "infrastructure", i.e., closing one office only to let the PKK cell leaders bob up in another, he

then said. As in old Marxist structures, the PKK cell leaders themselves must be removed from activity, he went on. In the past, Turkey had to tell Damascus "to kick out" PKK leaders based in Syria; he wouldn't want the GoT to be faced with the same scenario vis-a-vis Iraq. Davutoglu did not specify steps (arrests? expulsions?) that the GoT might expect the GoI to take off its own bat.

15. (SBU) Davutoglu asked about General Ralston's work-plans. High visibility in Turkey and Iraq will be "most important;" he urged that Ralston not simply base himself in Washington with the occasional fly-in to the region. The fact that the appointment had taken two months had sparked some criticism in Ankara, he volunteered.

16. (C) A/S Fried then said "at some point there will be the question of what steps Turkey can take to attract non-terrorist Kurds back to re-integrate themselves into Turkish society." Davutoglu reiterated his theme that only by permanently "dissolving PKK structures" will the stage be reached where non-terrorist Kurds would feel safe from the militants and hence free to move back for social re-integration within Turkey. "If they continue to survive in the Iranian (sic) mountains, closing their offices will not help us." A/S Fried asked if this meant there was a timing question, i.e., that only after such dissolution would Turkey commence conciliatory steps. Davutoglu gave no direct reply.

17. (C) He then mentioned that according to Turkish military intelligence the PKK is now procuring sophisticated European weapons from Iraq, or perhaps better to say from "the Iraq environment." These are weapons the Peshmerga cannot get from

USUN NEW Y 00001856 002 OF 003

Iran or Syria or any other source. With them, the PKK is able to exact casualties that the Turkish public sees as a sign of baffling GoT weakness. Davutoglu volunteered that General Baser would supply USG with more detail.

Cyprus

18. (C) A/S Fried said the USG wants to avoid an EU accession train wreck this autumn, and mooted the Finnish and USG's own tentative new packages for settlement. He had met with the Cypriot FM, who at least "had not rejected categorically" the new packages. NSC's Ansley interjected that the new Finnish proposal was certainly not conceived as a Grand Bargain for overall settlement, but rather as a way simply to edge forward, decrease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, etc. It also has the plus of being an EU proposal.

19. (C) There ensued discussion of various technical details in some depth and length. However, Davutoglu from start to finish was definitely, albeit politely, unenthusiastic. He repeatedly stated that the GoT does not see the Finnish package as "balanced" (carefully adding each time "but we can discuss it".) "It does not give Northern Cyprus enough", especially vis--vis elimination of sanctions, key to the area's two main revenue sources of tourism and education. The GoT cannot afford to risk being seen as going along with the Finnish package as is, in a political atmosphere wherein it is already accused even by the CHP - Turkey's most secular party - of defending Israel's interests by dispatching troops to Lebanon. The Europeans, apart from the UK, are not objective or neutral on Cyprus, Davutoglu added in conclusion.

Kirkuk

10. (C) Davutoglu then said he wanted to raise the subject of Kirkuk. "Please do not underestimate" its explosive potential: Kirkuk may not be a hot theme at present but is bound to become one next year "not just for us but for Iraq, for you and for the world." Last week's flag-issue episode

was merely a signal. Social polarization around Kirkuk proceeds amidst intensifying frustration over the oil and other questions. A delegation of Sunni Arab academics from Mosul recently told senior Turkish figures that "we can not now live with the Kurds." Given that the Iraqi constitution provides for a referendum in 2007, "we have two options" to keep tensions from becoming critical. The first -- since the constitution does not stipulate any referendum wording - is "to work with society" on the formulation so as to avoid that referendum being posed as "do you want to be part of Kurdistan?" Failing that, it would be better to postpone the referendum. The Kurds took 52 percent in Kirkuk's last election but now account for just 40 percent of its population after the latest demographic shifts, Davutoglu reckoned. He said the GoT's new special envoy will discuss this concern in Washington on 9/25-26.

Al-Qadi

¶11. (C) A/S Fried stressed that Turkey is obliged under the UNSCR to freeze Al-Qadi's assets in the same spirit and letter of the law with which we and the West Europeans have worked to freeze PKK assets. Harm to Turkish bank clients is also in store if this issue abides. Davutoglu said he did not know details of the Al-Qadi case, but then proceeded to appear quite informed. He said he understood that there had been in fact two separate GoT appeals against the court decision, one from the Prime Ministry (sic), the other from Foreign Affairs. Possibly just one of these two had been dropped on technical or duplicative grounds, he suggested. He then asked if the evidence against Al-Qadi might be old or insubstantial. Ansley and Fried both reiterated that the evidence had sufficed for the UN to place Al-Qadi on its list. They agreed that the Turkish government cannot be held responsible for a court decision; however, if the Turkish courts or government had doubts on the case there exists a formal UN procedure to apply for de-listing - and meanwhile the GoT is obliged to respect the listing. We were willing to supply the GoT available additional information. Davutoglu then reflected as if thinking aloud that long-ago cooperation between Erdogan and Al-Qadi when the former was

USUN NEW Y 00001856 003 OF 003

mayor of Istanbul might be at the root of his reported directive to unfreeze the latter's assets.

Western Thrace/Halki

¶12. (SBU) Davutoglu said he had discussed this issue the previous day with the Turkish PM. "The problem is a constitutional barrier." Per Turkey's 1971 law, the Halki "school" would have to be registered with the Ministry of Education "This is part of secularism." There would be absolutely no problem with either the students or the instruction language being non-Turkish -- but the institution itself would have to be put under either the Ministry or the Board of Education. Davutoglu said he had heard the Halki matter is the subject of an incipient U.S. Congressional motion, and asked if we could confirm that. As for Western Thrace, he simply observed that the Mufti's death made the issue more keen, and that the GoT had re-iterated to the Greeks its standard position that "according to the 1926 Lausanne agreement, these are not (exclusively) domestic issues."

Pope's Trip

¶13. (SBU) Asked about prospects for Benedict's imminent scheduled visit, Davutoglu said "I hope the Pope can make gestures" to abate the Islamic reaction. He did not sound 100% convinced that the visit will take place.

¶13. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
BOLTON